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This article summarizes many of the U.S. Supreme
Court's criminal law decisions of the last term.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Probable Cause Hearings
In County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661
(1991), the Supreme Court held that a 48-hour delay
between the time of arrest and a hearing to determine
probable cause did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In
an earlier case, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the
Court had held that the Fourth Amendment required a
"prompt" judicial determination of probable cause if a
person is arrested without a warrant. McLaughlin
involved a class action challenging the manner in which
the County of Riverside implemented this requirement.
Under the County's policy the probable cause determi·
nation was combined with the arraignment. Arraignments,
under state law, must be conducted within two days of
arrest. Weekends and holidays, however, were excluded
from the two-day computation. Consequently, a person
arrested late in the week could be held for as many as
five days before receiving a probable cause hearing. Over
the Thanksgiving holiday, a 7-day delay was possible.
The Supreme Court wanted to provide states with
some flexibility in complying with the Gerstein requirement, thereby permitting states to incorporate the probable cause determination into bail or initial appearance
proceedings. "But flexibility has its limits; Gerstein is not
a blank check. A State has no legitimate interest in
detaining for extended periods individuals who have
been arrested without probable cause." /d. at 1669.
Because the lower courts had failed to agree on what
constitutes a "prompt" hearing, the Supreme Court felt
compelled to provide more specific guidance: "a jurisdic·
tion that provides judicial determination of probable
cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as general matter,
comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. For
this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from
systemic challenges." /d. at 1670. The Court went on to
state, however, that the 48-hour limit determined only the
burden of proof. The burden rests on the defendant when
the detention is less than 48 hours and rests on the

~-~_ooL usRAR'I

prosecution for detentions of m~~AB hours. The
Court commented:
This is not to say that the probable cause determination in a particular case passes constitutional muster
simply because it is provided within 48 hours. Such a
hearing may nonetheless violate Gerstein if the arrested individual can prove that his or her probable cause
determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples of
unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of
gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a
delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake. /d. at 1670.
A delay over 48 hours is presumptively invalid, shifting
the burden to the prosecution to justify the delay. A bona
fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstances
might suffice; intervening weekends and delays to
consolidate proceedings would not. A jurisdiction wishing to combine procedures must do so within the 48-hour
period.

Seizure
California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991), presented
the Court with the opportunity to decide whether a fleeing suspect is "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when the police give chase. Two police
officers in an unmarked car rounded a corner and began
to drive toward a group youths. When the car approached,
the youths began to flee. The officers became suspicious
and pursued some of them, one officer in the car and the
other on foot: Hodari threw away what appeared to be a
small rock just before he was tackled by the officer. He
was carrying a pager and $130 in cash. The "rock"
turned out to be crack cocaine.
The key issue was: When did the seizure occur? A
California appellate court had held that Hodari had been
"seized" when he saw the officer running toward him.
Under this analysis, the crack would be the fruit of an
illegal detention due to the lack of reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the seizure
occurred after the crack was dropped. The majority did
not believe that the text of the Fourth Amendment nor its
underlying policy supported the lower court's interpretation.
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The Court wrote:
In sum, assuming that [the officer's] pursuit in the
present case constituted a "show of authority" enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with
that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.
The cocaine abandoned while he was running was in
this case not the fruit of a seizure, and his motion to
exclude it was pro.Rerly denied. /d. at 1552.
One 6ther aspe~tciH6!dari deserves comment. The
State conceded that'fhe youths' flight did not amount to
reason~DIRsuspicion.T~e Supreme Court accepted this
conce~slbn for purpOS!i~iof deciding this case. In a footnote, ~bw~y~r,}l]e,meioWty question~d this point:
Tha{ it wou'ld·be·~nreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry,
YO!J~:g:_lj;l"Efi'{£\'f.lt?.:sc::att~r in panic upon the mere sighting offfre"p'oliee-is iietself-evident, and arguably
contradicts proverbial common sense. See Proverbs
28:i ('The wicked flee when no man puisueth'). We do
not decide that point here, but rely entirely upon the
State's concession. /d. at 1549 n.1.

"consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without
more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective
justification needed for a detention or seizure." /d. at 238/
Automobile Searches
The Court granted certiorari in California v. Acevedo,
111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991), to "reexamine the law applicable tc
a closed container in an automobile, a subject that has
troubled courts and law enforcement officers since it wa:
first considered in Chadwick." /d. at 1985.
The police had seized a shipment of marijuana and
then let a suspect take control of it and bring it to his
apartment. Shortly thereafter another man arrived and le:
with a blue knapsack. When he was stopped, marijuana
was found in the knapsack. The defendant, Charles
Acevedo, was the next person to enter the apartment.
He left with a bag the size of the individually wrapped
marijuana packages found in the shipment. He placed
the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away.
The police stopped the car, searched the trunk, and
found marijuana when they opened the bag.
These facts raised an issue that was bound to return tc
the Supreme Court. The Court's prior cases, United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), had created a strange rule.
If the police had probable cause to believe contraband
was in an automobile, they could search the entire car
without a warrant, including any container in the car. If,
however, the police had probable cause that the contraband was in a container in a automobile, they could seizt
the container but could not search it without a warrant.
Not surprisingly, the Court eliminated this anomaly by
dispensing with the warrant requirement for all containers foundinautomobiles,.providedthere is probable
cause: "The police may search an automobile and the
containers within it where they have probable cause to
believe contraband or evidence is contained." /d. at 199·
As the dissent points out, however, the new ruling still
leaves an anomaly. The police must obtain a warrant if
they seize a briefcase from a pedestrian, but no warrant
is required if they wait until the pedestrian places the
briefcase in a car and begins to drive away.

Seizure
Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (1991), also involved a
"seizure" issue. This case involved two police officers
who boarded a bus, picked out Bostick, and asked to see
his ticket and identification. The officers were in uniform.
They had, however, no reasonable suspicion to single
out Bostick. After returning his identification, they
explained that they were on the lookout for drugs and
asked whether Bostick would consent to a search of his
bag.TheJrialcourt found that Bostick voluntarily
consented. Consequently, the critical issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the i 11itialcontact between
Bostick and the police was a "seizure." If this encounter
amounted to a seizure, it would have been illegal due to
the lack of reasonable suspicion, and thus the consent
would be tainted.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that when police
mount a drug search on buses during scheduled stops
and question boarded passengers without reasonable
suspicion an impermissible seizure occurs. The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected this analysis as inconsistent
with its earlier cases. These cases had held that a
seizure does not occur simply because the police
approach a person and ask questions. As long as a
reasonable person would feel free to leave, the encounter is consensual and reasonable suspicion is not
required. Only when the police, by means of physical
force or show of authority, have in some way restrained
the person's liberty does a "seizure" occur.
Bostick attempted to distinguish these cases because
the encounter took place "in the cramped confines of a
bus." He argued that such an encounter is more
intimidating in this setting because the "police tower
over a seated passenger and there is little room to move
around." /d. at 2386. The Court remained unconvinced.
As long as the passenger is not led by the police's
conduct to believe that he is not free to leave, no seizure
has occurred. The Court took pains to make two points.
First, the officers had advised Bostick of his right to
refuse to consent. Second, the officers never used or
threatened to use their weapons.
Significantly, the Court also pointed out that it had

Consent
Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (1991), involved a
defendant's consent to the search of an automobile
during whichthe police found drugs in a closed container. A policeman was following the defendant's car
because the policeman suspected drug activity. The
defendant's car was stopped when he made a right turn
without stopping at a red light. The officer told the defen
dant that he thought drugs were in the car and that he
wanted to search the car. He also informed the defendar
that the defendant did not have to consent. The defendant replied by saying that he had "nothing to hide" and
the officer could search. During the search the officer
found a folded, brown paper bag on the floorboard. He
opened the bag and discovered a kilogram of cocaine.
The Florida Court of Appeals ruled the search illegal
because it went beyond the scope of the defendant's
consent. According to that court, consent to a general
search for narcotics does not extend to sealed containe1
within the general area agreed to by the defendant. The
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U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. The touchstone of the
Court's analysis was reasonableness. The scope of the
search is generally defined by its object, and the defendant consented to a search for drugs, which are typically
concealed in containers. "We think that it was objectively
reasonable for the police to conclude that the general
consent to search respondent's car included consent to
search containers within that car which might bear
drugs." /d. at 1804. The Court held: "The Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is
objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the
scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open a
particular container within the car." /d. at 1803.
The decision nevertheless does contain limiting
language. The Court stated that consent to the search of
a car trunk would not extend to a locked briefcase found
inside the trunk. "It is very likely unreasonable to think
that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk,
has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase
within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a
closed paper bag." /d. at 1804. In addition, a defendant
can delimit the scope of the search on his own initiative.

rogation without counsel present, whether or not the
accused has consulted with his attorney. /d. at 491.

Miranda vs. Right to Counsel
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (1991), turned on
the distinction between the right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment and the right to counsel under Miranda, a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination case.
McNeil was arrested in Nebraska for a Wisconsin bank
robbery. Two Milwaukee sheriffs were sent to retrieve
him. After receiving Miranda warnings, McNeil refused to
answer questions, but he did not request counsel. Once
back in Milwaukee, McNeil was brought before a
commissioner for an initial appearance on the bank
robbery charge, at which time a public defender was
appointed to represent him.
A detective investigating an unrelated murder and
burglary visited McNeil at the jail that evening. Miranda
warnings were given and waived. McNeil did not deny
knowledge of these crimes but merely said that he was
not involved. Two days later the detective returned, McNeil
again waived his Miranda rights, and then admitted his
involvement in the murder and burglary. After checking
out McNeil's story, the detective returned a third time.
McNeil again waived his Miranda rights and made another
incriminating statement. At trial tor the murder and
burglary, he moved to suppress his three statements
~r_g_uing that his court appearance with an attorney o~ the
m1t1al bank robbery charge constituted an invocation of
his Miranda right to counsel for the other crimes.
On review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument.
The Court's prior Sixth Amendment cases had held that
on?e the right to counsel has attached, a subsequent
wa1ver at a police-initiated custodial interview is ineftecti_ve. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). Here, the
nght to counsel for the bank robbery had attached at the
initial appearance, and McNeil had not initiated the interview at the jail. The Court ruled, however, that the "Sixth
Amendment right ... is offense-specific. It cannot be
invoked for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach
until a prosecution is commenced, that is, 'at or after the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedingsyvh~ther by v:'ay of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
1nd1ctment, mformation, or arraignment'." /d. at 2207.
Consequently, McNeil's Sixth Amendment right to counsel for_t~e murder-burglary charges had not yet attached.
In add1t1on, he waived his Miranda Fifth Amendment
right to counsel before giving each statement. McNeil's
claim rested on a combination of the Sixth and Fifth
Amendment rights, but the Court required a separate
analysis of the two constitutional guarantees.

CONFESSIONS

Miranda: Right to Counsel
In Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990), the
defendant was apprehended in California for murder and
other crimes committed in Mississippi. After his arrest,
he was first interviewed by FBI agents. H13 received
Miranda warnings, refused to sign a waiver form, and
made some incriminatory statements. He told the agents
to "Come back Monday when I have a lawyer present."
/d. at 488. An attorney was appointed, and Minnick consult~d with him. On the following Monday, a Mississippi
shenff sought to interview Minnick. Minnick later testified
that his jailers told him he had to meet with the sheriff.
Again Miranda warnings were given, and again Minnick
declined to sign a rights waiver form. Nevertheless, he
went on to make extensive inculpatory comments. His
comments in this last interview were admitted against
him at trial, and he was convicted.
The Supreme Court agreed with Minnick's Miranda
argument. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.477 (1981), the
Court had ruled that once a suspect asserts his right to
counsel under Miranda, questioning must cease and a
subsequent interrogation could not commence unless
the suspect initiated the second contact with the police.
The Edwards rule was designed to prevent the police
from badgering a suspect into waiving his previously
asserted Miranda rights. It also had the advantage of
providing a clear and unequivocal guideline.
The Mississippi Supreme Court had held that this
requirement had been satisfied in Minnick's case
because he had consulted with counsel before the reinterrogation. The Supreme Court rejected this reading of
Edwards. The Court wrote:
In our view, a fair reading of Edwards and subsequent
cases demonstrates that we have interpreted the rule
to bar police-initiated interrogation unless the accused
has counsel with him at the time of questioning. Whatever the ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point,
we _now hold that when counsel is requested, interrogatiOn must cease, and officials may not reinitiate inter-

Involuntary Confessions: Harmless Error
In Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991), the
Court re_versed its long-st~nding rule that involuntary
confessions '!'ere not subject to harmless error analysis.
Under the pnor cases, the admissibility of such a confession resulted in automatic reversal of the conviction.
Fulminante reported to the police that his 11-year-old
stepdaughter was missing. Her body was discovered two
days later. Fulminante became a suspect but charges
were never filed. This occurred in 1982. He subsequently
moved to New Jersey and was sent to prison for a later

3

?B
.-

4o1 cs 1W~
)(L

JJll

-·

nQ/Gf; nn-lnA-06 Gee

firearms violation. While detained, another inmate, an
FBI informant, learned about the Arizona killing. The
informant told Fulminante that he could protect
Fulminante from other inmates only if Fulminante told
him about the killing. Fulminante admitted his involvement in the stepdaughter's death.
The Supreme Court ruled that the confession had
been coerced. There had been a credible threat of
physical violence against Fulminante because the other
inmates had learned that he was a "child murderer." The
critical issue involved the consequence of this finding.
The Court had long held that a conviction based on an
involuntary confession could not stand. This rule applied
even if there was ample other evidence to support the
conviction. A five-Justice majority scrapped this automatic reversal rule. A conviction need not be reversed in this
context if the prosecution can establish that the erroneously admitted confession was harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt.

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Standing
In Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991), a white defendant challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude black venirepersons from a jury in
an aggravated murder prosecution. Citing Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the defendant raised Sixth
Amendment Qury trial) and Fourteenth Amendment
(equal protection) challenges to this conduct.
The Court had long held that racial discrimination in
the jury selection pfocess offended the Equal Protection
Clause. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the
Court for the first time considered the use of peremptory
challenges as a device to exclude jurors because of their
race. The Court rejected Swain's challenge, but indicated
that the systematic exclusion of black persons through
the use of peremptories over a period of time might
establish an Equal Protection violation. This burden,
however, was difficult to satisfy, and the Court revisited
the issue in Batson. In that case the Court held that a
defendant could raise an Equal Protection challenge to
the use of peremptories at his own trial by showing that
the prosecutor had used them for the purpose of excluding members of the defendant's race. Establishing
systematic exclusion over a period of time, as suggested
in Swain, was not required. The Court rested its decision
on Equal Protection grounds.
In a subsequent decision, Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 110 S.Ct. 803 (1990}, the defendant made a Sixth
Amendment challenge, based on the "fair cross section"
guarantee of the right to trial by jury. A majority of the
Court ruled that the "fair cross section" requirement
applied to the jury pool and not to the petit jury chosen
frorfrtliat pool. Thus; pefremptory challenges could not
be attacked on this ground. Five Justices, however,
suggested that an Equal Protection challenge might be
successful. Justice Kennedy, writing a concurring opinion, indicated that he would side with the four dissenting
Justices if a Fourteenth Amendment challenge had been
raised: "I find it essential to make clear that if the claim
here were based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause, it would have merit." /d. at 811.
The principal problem with the Equal Protection argument raised in Powers concerned the issue of standing.
Swain suggested and Batson held that the exclusion of
jurors on a racial basis by means of peremptory
challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause. Batson
a black man, had challenged the exclusion of other
blacks from the jury. Powers, however, was a white defen
dant challenging the exclusion of black jurors. The issue
turned on whether a white defendant suffered any harm
in this situation. The Court held that Powers had sutferec
such a harm:
The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon
the criminal defendant and the community as a whole
that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in
accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The
verdict will not be accepted or understood in these
terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the
outset. Upon these considerations, we find that a
criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the
prosecutor excludes jurors at his or her own trial on
account of race. 111 S.Ct. at 1372.

GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
The Court considered grand jury practice in United
States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 722 (1991). The
issue involved a challenge to a subpoena duces tecum
issued by a federal grand jury investigating the interstate
transportation of obscene material. The subpoenas
required the production of corporate records and numerous videotapes shipped by three companies owned by
Martin Rothstein. All three companies moved to quash
the subpoenas on relevancy grounds.
The Supreme Court focused on Federal Criminal Rule
17(c};wFHcngoveths subpoenas duces tecum in federal
practice. The rule authorizes the trial court to quash or
modify asubpoena if "compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." The Court determined that "reasonableness" differed according to context and the standards
applicable to trial subpoenas do not apply to grand jury
subpoenas. In particular the Court held that the standards of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), were
inapplicable. Nixon had held that a party seeking production of documents must make a reasonably specific
request for information that would be both relevant and
admissible at trial.
The prosecution need not make such a showing when
agrand jury subpoena is challenged. These subpoenas
are "pr!3?Umed tobe reasonable" and the burden to
demonstrate unreasonableness rests on the challenging
party. This burden is substantial:
[W]Ilere ... a subpoena is challenged on relevancy
grounds, the motion to quash must be denied unless
the district court determines that there is no reasonable
possibility that the category of materials the Government
seeks will produce information relevant to the general
subject of the grand jury's investigation. /d. at 728.
The Court acknowledged that this standard was especially stringent for the recipient of the subpoena because
there is no requirement that the recipient be apprised of
the subject matter of the investigation. The Court
suggested that the trial court could require the Government to make an in camera disclosure of the subject
matter of the investigation. This procedure would
preserve grand jury secrecy and preclude the use of
challenges as a discovery device.
4

This analysis was also supported by a third-party standing argument, with the Court finally concluding "that a
defendant in a criminal case can raise the third-party
equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because of their race." /d. at 1373.

than the race of the juror.... Unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral. /d. at 1866.
The defendant argued that Spanish-language ability
was closely related to ethnicity, and thus the use of
peremptories on this basis violated Equal Protection
guarantees. The plurality opinion side-stepped this issue
by pointing out that language alone was not the basis for
the strike. The prosecutor explained that the two potential
jurors hesitated in responding and their demeanor also
caused him to question whether they would accept the
official translation. Accordingly, the explanation was
race-neutral: "As explained by the prosecutor, the
challenges rested neither on the intention to exclude
Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions
about Latinos or bilinguals." Although the prosecutor's
position "might well result in the disproportionate removal
of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact
does not turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause." /d. at 1867. The trial
court found no discriminatory intent, and the Supreme
Court would not disturb this finding because it was not
"clearly erroneous." /d. at 1871.

Civil Cases and Peremptories by the Defense
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc., 111
S.Ct. 2077 (1991), the Court extended Batson to civil litigation. This case is important because it suggests the
answer to another issue: Poes Batson apply to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges? Several lower
courts have answered "yes." See United States v. De
Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1990).
The principal issue is whether there is state action
when the defendant strikes jurors on racial grounds, an
issue also critical in analyzing whether Batson applies to
civil litigation. The Court in Edmonson wrote:
Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may
be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury
selection proceedings is to determine representation
on a governmental body. Were it not for peremptory
challenges, there would be no question that the entire
process of determining who will serve mn the jury
constitutes state act. The fact that the government
delegates some portion of this power to private litigants does not change the governmental character of
the power exercised. 111 S.Ct. at 2086.
This reasoning also would seem to apply to a criminal
defendant's use of peremptories. In dissent Justice
Scalia noted that the rationale of Edmonson would make
Batson applicable to criminal defendants: "The effect of
today's decision (which logically must apply to criminal
prosecutions) will be to prevent the defendant from [racebased strikes]- so that the minority defendant can no
longer seek to prevent an all-white jury, or to seat as
many jurors of his own race as possible." /d. at 2095. The
Court subsequently granted certiorari on this issue.
Georgia v. McCullum, 112 S.Ct. 370 (1991).

PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY

Voir Dire
The defendant in Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899
(1991), was charged with the murder of a woman in
Prince William County, Virginia. At the time of the murder
Mu'ium was out of prison on a work detail. The case
generated substantial publicity. Eight of the twelve
venirepersons eventually sworn as jurors had read or
heard something about the case. They also stated that
they had formed no opinion and would consider only the
evidence admitted at trial.
Mu'min was convicted, sentenced to death, and appealed.
He argued that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury and his right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated because the trial judge
refused to question the jurors about the specific content
of the news reports to which they had been exposed.
The defendant had initially asked for a change of
venue because of the pretrial publicity, which included
numerous articles about the crime and the defendant,
including the fact that he had been sentenced to prison
for an earlier murder. The trial court deferred ruling on
this motion until after it attempted to seat a jury. The
defense next submitted 64 proposed voir dire questions
and a motion for individual voir dire. The court rejected
both the questions and the motion. Instead, the jurors
who had indicated that they had heard of the case were
asked if they could keep an open mind and wait until all
the evidence had been introduced before reaching a
fixed opinion.
The Supreme Court found nothing wrong with this
procedure. A trial court's failure to ask questions on voir
dire violates the Constitution only if it is fundamentally
unfair. Under the constitutional standard, the issue "is
not whether the community remembered the case, but
whether the jurors . . . had such fixed opinions that they
could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant."
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984). The Court
believed that the trial court's conduct on voir dire

Standard of Review
In Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike two
Latinos from the jury panel. The defendant objected on
Batson grounds. In response, the prosecutor explained
that he feared that the two jurors would not be able to
accept an interpreter's version of the testimony of
Spanish-speaking witnesses.
The Supreme Court, in a split decision, ruled that the
prosecutor's conduct had not violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court set out a three-step procedure for
analyzing Batson issues: (1) Initially, the defendant must
make a prima facie showing of the racial basis for
peremptory strikes. (2) Once this showing is made, the
burden shifts to the prosecution who must offer a raceneutral explanation for its conduct. (3) Finally, the court
must determine whether the prosecution has satisfied its
burden. The issue in Hernandez was whether the prosecution's explanation amounted to a valid race-neutral
explanation under the second prong of the Batson test.
The Court wrote:
A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis
here means an explanation based on something other
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satisfied this standard. Further specific questions were
not required, at least not on this record.

up to the indictment were far more pervasive.
DEFENSE EVIDENCE: RAPE SHIELD LAWS
The defendant in Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S.Ct. 1743
(1991), was charged with rape. A "rape shield" statute
required a rape defendant to give the prosecution 10-day
notice of his intention to present evidence of an alleged
rape victim's past sexual conduct. Lucas failed to comply
with the notice requirement, and the trial court refused to
allow such evidence at trial. On appeal, a Michigan
appellate court ruled that the exclusion of defense
evidence-was"a-per seviolation of the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to present a defense. The Supreme
Court reversed.
Any statute that operates to prevent an accused from
presenting relevant evidence implicates the Sixth
Amendment. The right to present a defense, however, is
not without limit. Indeed, in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400
(1988), the Court had ruled that under some circumstances a trial court could exclude defense evidence as a
sanction for the defendant's failure to comply with prosecution discovery requests. Taylor did not hold that preclusion of defense evidence could always be justified, only
that preclusion was not per se unconstitutional.
The Court applied the same reasoning in Lucas: "The
notice-and-hearing requirement serves legitimate state
interests in protecting against surprise, harassment, and
undue delay. Failure to comply with this requirement may
in some cases justify even the severe sanction of preclusion." /d. at 1748. Consequently, the Court rejected the
view that preclusion of defense evidence was a per se
violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Court refused to
decide whether preclusion could be justified on the facts
of this case. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the
lower court to.determine this issue.

Gag Rules on Defense Attorneys
Gentile v. State Bar,of Nevada, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (1991),
involved a defense attorney who was disciplined for holding a press conference. The press conference was held
the day after his client was indicted, and Gentile asserted
that his client was a scapegoat and that the crime had
been committed by police officers. Six months after the
press conference, the client was tried and acquitted.
Thereafter, the State Bar found that Gentile's conduct at
the press conference violated a court rule on pretrial
publicity, which is almost identical to ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.6. The Rule prohibited an attorney
from making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by means of
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should have known that it will have a substantial likelihood
of material prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding."
Gentile argued that the rule violated his First Amendment
and Due Process rights.
The case turned on the due process issue. Gentile
argued that the rule was void for vagueness. The Rule
recognized an exception; an attorney may "state without
elaboration ... the general nature of the ... defense."
According to the Court, the terms "general" and "elaboration" were "both classic terms of degree."
In the context before us, these terms have no settled
usage or traditionof interpretation. The lawyer has no
priociplefordetermining when his remarks pass from
the safe harbor of the general to the forbidden sea of
the elaborated. /d. at 2731.
The Rule therefore provided insufficient notice of what
was proscribed, a traditional"void-for-vagueness"
concern. In addition, a vague provision raises the possibility of discriminatory enforcement. The Court believed
that this was a real possibility, a danger which is of
"particular relevance when one of the classes most
affected by the regulation is the criminal defense bar,
which has the professional mission to challenge actions
of the State." !d. at 2732.
The First Amendment issue produced a different
majority. Justice O'Connor, who joined in the due process analysis with fourother Justices, sided with a different majority on the freedom of speech issue. This
majority, led by the Chief Justice, held that attorneys'
First Amendment rights were limited by their participation in the judicial process. These five Justices believed
that "the speech of lawyers representing clients in
pending cases may be regulated under a less
demanding standard than that established for regulation
of the press ...." /d. at 2744. In particular, a "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" standard could be used
in lieu of the more exacting "clear and present danger"
standard.
Because Gentile's statement was made six months
before trial and the jury was to be selected from a population in excess of 600,000 persons, the Court found that
the press conference could not have prejudiced the jury
selection process. Indeed, the record showed that police
and prosecutor comments on the investigation leading

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The defendant in Harrnelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680
(1991), was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment
without possibility of parole for possessing over 1.5
pounds of cocaine. A first-time offender, Harmelin
challenged his sentence as violative of the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment. He argued that the sentence was significantly disproportionate to the crime committed and that
its mandatory imposition precluded the sentencing court
from consideringt_he circumstances of the crime or of the
criminal. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions.
The Court's most recent decision on the application of
the Eighth Amendment in rioncapital cases was Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The Court in Solem struck
down a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility
of parole because it was grossly disproportionate to the
crime charged and underlying recidivism statute upon
which the sentence was based.
In Harme/in a plurality of the Court took the position
that "the Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it
forbids only extreme sentences that are " 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime." 111 S.Ct. at 2705. Like
Solem, Harmelin received the second most severe penalty permitted by law. His crime, however, was far more
serious than the relatively minor nonviolent offenses
committed by Solem.
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